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ABSTRACT. This paper studies the impact of the largest conservation set-aside program
in the developing world: China’s Grain for Green program, on poverty alleviation in
rural areas. Based on a large-scale survey, we find that the program was implemented
mostly in the areas of China that are fairly poor. In addition, we show that income
from livestock activities and some types of asset holdings of participants have increased
significantly more than those of non-participants (due to program effects). Only weak
evidence is provided demonstrating that participating households have begun to shift
their labor into the off-farm sectors. Overall, the results suggest that the program has
been moderately successful in achieving its poverty alleviation objectives.
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1. Introduction
In recent years there has been an increasing interest in using incentive
mechanisms, known as Payments for Environmental Services (PES)
to finance conservation in developing countries (Landell-Mills and
Porras, 2002; Pagiola and Platais, 2005). Some developing countries
have introduced PES programs to encourage land owners to enhance
certain environmental services, such as biodiversity conservation or carbon
sequestration. In contrast to many of the programs that failed, at least in
part because they lacked incentives to generate environmental services,
households in an increasing number of countries, such as Costa Rica,
Columbia, and Ecuador, are participating in PES schemes. Governments
in other parts of the world also have begun designing similar programs
(Pagiola, 2002; Pagiola and Platais, 2005).
Aside from the effect on the environment, one of the most critical
questions about the use of PES programs in developing countries is the
impact that the programs have on the poor. There are two contrasting
views. Proponents of PES argue that although the PES approach was
conceptualized as a mechanism primarily to improve natural resource
management, it could also serve as a tool for poverty alleviation (Pagiola
and Platais, 2005). A PES program can offer a means to increase the
income of the rural poor and reduce risk by diversifying income sources,
mainly through its monetary payments. Furthermore, depending on the
environmental service demanded, the land owners that provide such
environmental services could be predominantly poor. For example, a PES
program may target farmers that live in the upper reaches of a river basin
and pay them to plant trees to reduce sedimentation in a watershed. To the
extent that the upstream farmers are poor, a well-designed program could
contribute to the alleviation of poverty.
In contrast, others have suggested that PES programs are likely to have
negligible or even adverse effects on poverty. Poor farmers participating
in a PES program (particularly in a non-voluntary one) may end up worse
off if they are not compensated for their opportunity costs either due to
a flawed incentive mechanism design or poor program implementation.
Furthermore, land in a region could be distributed in a way such that the
particular types of land that are productive in generating environmental
services may not be owned by the poor. Even if some appropriate land were
owned by the poor, the program might be ill-targeted and systematically
exclude the poor. In particular, if a program provides high compensation,
it could attract both poor and rich. Given their higher inherent abilities and
social connections, if participation is limited, higher-income households
may have an advantage in gaining participation rights. Lastly, PES
programs often are designed on the assumption that structural changes
in household income-earning activities will occur. However, if farmers
are unable to find alternative income sources during the program period,
and are not allowed to convert their land back to cultivation when the
program payments stop, they may be trapped in poverty (Landell-Mills and
Porras, 2002). Surprisingly, despite the controversy, little empirical evidence
exists on the impact of PES programs on poverty, or the distributional
consequences of these incentive mechanisms. Whether or not the poor are
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able to take advantage of the PES programs remains to be examined (Pagiola
et al., 2002).
To address this question, this paper uses information from a data
collection effort that we designed and implemented to evaluate a large-scale
PES program in China. Pushed into action by a series of devastating floods
in 1998, China’s government started a conservation set-aside program,
frequently known as Grain for Green, in 1999. Known as one of the
largest conservation set-aside programs in the world, its main objective
is to increase forest cover on sloped cropland in the upper reaches of the
Yangtze and Yellow River Basins to prevent soil erosion. When available in
their community, households set aside all or parts of certain types of land
and plant seedlings to grow trees. In return the government compensates
the participants with in-kind grain, cash payments, and free seedlings. By
the end of 2002, officials expanded the program to some 15 million farmers
in more than 2000 counties in 25 provinces and municipalities in China (Xu
et al., 2004a). If the program meets its original goals, by 2010 leaders will
have set aside nearly 15 million hectares of cropland, affecting the land of
more than 50 million households. If implemented to its intended size, such
a program would surpass in area the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)
in the United States (Xu et al., 2004a).
While the environmental goals are clear, under the current program
design it is ambiguous whether or not the Grain for Green program will
benefit the poor. On the one hand, proponents of the program argue that
the Grain for Green program could have significant positive impact on
the poor. While preventing soil erosion is the primary objective, the State
Forestry Administration also explicitly states that poverty alleviation and
restructuring agricultural production into a more environmentally and
economically sustainable set of activities are also program goals (State
Forestry Administration, 2002). Moreover, the compensation level of the
Grain for Green program is higher on per acre basis compared to the
CRP (Uchida et al., 2005). In addition, when rural households retire their
cropland, it is possible that farmers could use their freed up on-farm labor
and choose to allocate the labor off the farm into the wage earning or self-
employed labor market. Migration is an important way out of poverty in
China (Li et al., 2003). In general, since urbanization and industrialization
are the main conduits of economic development (e.g., Lewis, 1954; Nurkse,
1957), transition of the labor force from rural to urban and from agriculture
sector to industrial sector would be desirable for China’s long-run economic
development. If the program could aid the process of migration, we believe
it shows that Grain for Green has longer-term dynamic consequences for
China’s overall development.
On the other hand, it is possible that the Grain for Green program
may leave its participants worse off. Potential problems include problems
with incentive design, targeting, as well as implementation. Although the
central government states that poverty alleviation is one of the program
goals, there is no clear statement that poverty is one of the criteria in
the program area selection process. Similar to previous poverty alleviation
programs in China, political factors could affect targeting. Park et al. (2002)
found that in China’s poverty alleviation programs, political factors have
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led to less accurate targeting and deteriorated impact of programs on
rural income growth. Given that the program offers a relatively high
level of compensation, it is possible that local officials strategically favor
a particular group – and given their higher inherent abilities and social
connections, higher-income households may have an advantage in being
allowed to participate in the program. Furthermore, if the compensation is
not delivered – as some official reports indicate – the welfare of participants
could become worse. Even if compensation is delivered, it is possible that
its level may still be lower than the household’s opportunity cost (i.e.,
the household’s foregone agricultural profit), as was found in Uchida et al.
(2005). The program could also be another repetition of afforestation projects
in the past where lack of technical assistance and insufficient attention paid
to management of the planted seedlings led to low survival rate (e.g., Smil,
1993). If officials stopped payments because of low survival rate, households
could be left with less income and a hillside full of withered seedlings.
To meet the overall goal of evaluating the impact of China’s PES program
on the poor, this paper has two specific objectives. First, we seek to assess
who is participating in the Grain for Green program, and thus understand
whether China’s program officials are disproportionately targeting the poor
or not. To do so, we will examine the determinants of participation at the
household level. Second, we seek to understand the impact of the program
on income, assets, and the labor allocation decisions of participating
households. We utilize recent program evaluation methods in our attempt
to overcome the selection bias problem that is inherent in non-experimental
studies. We also examine whether or not the program impacts, if any, are
different for the poorer participants.
2. The data and the Grain for Green program
The data used in this paper come from a household survey executed
by the authors in 2003. The survey was commissioned by China’s State
Forest Administration as part of their effort to evaluate the nation’s Grain
for Grain program after the third year of implementation. To the best
of our knowledge this is the only existing data set that includes both
participating and non-participating households. A total of 359 households
in three provinces (Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu), six counties, 18 townships
and 36 villages were interviewed. Of these, 75 per cent of the households
participated in the Grain for Green program.2 Summary statistics of
household characteristics, income, asset holdings, and labor allocation
outcomes for participating and non-participating households in 1999
(before the program) and 2002 (after the program) are presented in tables 1
and 2.
The household survey employed a sampling strategy designed to collect
data on a random sample of households in the program area. From the three
2 The Grain for Green program was announced in 1999 and approved in 2000.
Although some households started to retire land in 1999, the earliest year that the
households could have received some compensation was in 2000. We drop the
20 households who said they started to receive compensation in 1999 to reduce
possible biases.
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Table 1. Sample average for participating and non-participating households in the
Grain for Green program (2003)
(1)
Participating
households
(2) Non-
participating
households
(3) Difference
in mean
(1)–(2)
(t-statistics in
parentheses)
Household Size 4.84 (1.69) 4.47 (1.30) 0.38 (1.86)∗
Number of Children
(≤ 15 years old)
1.14 (0.98) 0.95 (0.93) 0.12 (1.57)
Number of Adults
(≥ 16 years old)
3.69 (1.36) 3.51 (1.01) 0.18 (1.14)
Household head’s
age
47.77 (10.98) 47.69 (12.40) −0.08 (0.06)
Household head’s
educational
attainment
4.68 (3.33) 4.54 (3.68) 0.15 (0.34)
Female headed
household (%)
7.54 (0.26) 9.30 (29.22) −0.02 (0.52)
Household
landholding (mu)
13.85 (9.35) 10.25 (8.74) 3.59 (3.13)∗∗
Household
landholding per
capita (mu)
3.05 (2.17) 2.54 (2.37) 0.52 (1.86)∗
Weighted average of
distance from each
plot to house (m)a
1, 029.47 (880.92) 760.92 (803.56) 268.56 (2.50)∗
Weighted average of
distance from each
plot to water (m)a
1, 068.59 (1, 886.26) 810.99 (1, 401.14) 257.59 (1.16)
Weighted average of
distance from each
plot to road (m)a
852.33 (1, 098.32) 814.17 (1, 604.97) 38.16 (0.25)
Number of
households in
sample
253 86
Notes: aWeighted by the size of each plot.
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses for columns (1) and (2);
absolute values of t-statistics are reported in column (3). ∗ significant at 10%;
∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ survey.
provinces that had been participating in the Grain for Green program since
2000, two counties in each province and three townships in each county
were randomly selected. In each township, two participating villages were
selected, and, within each village, ten households were randomly selected.
There is at least one household participating in the program in every
village. In two out of 36 villages, all of the households in our sample were
participating households.
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Table 2. Sample average for participating and non-participating households in the Grain for Green program in 1999 and 2002
Participating households Non-participating households
(5) Difference in
mean in 1999
(1)–(3) (t-statistics
(1) 1999 (2) 2002a (3) 1999 (4) 2002a in parentheses)
Income per capita (yuan) 1, 404.41 (1, 516.38) 1, 675.25 (1, 797.70) 1, 850.41 (2, 126.33) 2, 026.11 (1, 926.95) −446.00 (2.11)∗
Agricultural income per
capita (yuan)
648.17 (807.01) 687.02 (1, 018.76) 869.06 (1, 392.09) 774.47 (920.37) −220.89 (1.79)∗
Off-farm work (number of
adults with off-farm work
in household)
3.58 (1.42) 3.63 (1.38) 3.44 (1.06) 3.45 (1.06) 0.13 (0.21)
Migration status (number of
adult migrants in
household)
0.35 (0.64) 0.48 (0.72) 0.23 (0.50) 0.41 (0.62) 0.12 (1.53)
Value of house
(yuan)
13, 659.45 (19, 104.72) 13, 744.45 (18, 994.64) 20, 066.54 (29, 639.19) 19, 682.79 (28, 599.90) −6, 407.10 (2.31)∗
Fixed productive assets
(yuan)
842.80 (1, 412.12) 1, 619.50 (3, 683.74) 948.47 (1, 912.12) 1, 259.68 (2, 273.94) −105.67 (0.54)
Consumer durables (yuan) 569.20 (988.09) 1, 623.46 (2, 645.82) 930.30 (2, 391.40) 2, 326.95 (3, 224.18) −361.10 (1.96)∗
Livestock inventories (yuan) 384.58 (518.15) 613.86 (897.62) 414.39 (442.43) 478.65 (360.38) −29.80 (0.48)
Total land in Grain for Green
program (mu)
2.26 (5.24) 7.15 (9.39) N.A.
In-kind and cash subsidy
from Grain for Green
program per capita (yuan)
N.A. 59.25 (88.94) N.A.
Number of households in
sample
253 86
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses for columns (1) through (4); absolute values of t-statistics are reported in column
(5). ∗significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%. N.A.=Not Applicable.
aValues in 2002 are converted to real terms using Consumer Price Index for each province.
Source: Authors’ survey.
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The household survey asked respondents about a number of variables
from both before (1999) and after (2002), the time the program began.
Enumerators collected information on the household’s production activities
on a plot-by-plot basis, as well as detailed information on each
household’s total asset holdings, its demographic make-up, and other
income earning activities from both on- and off-farm activities. We
acknowledge the problems inherent in recall data.3 Long-term recall data
are possibly inaccurate, although the literature continues to debate the issue.
Unfortunately, the government’s quick decision to implement Grain for
Green and lack of transparency in the details of implementation precluded
the option of conducting interviews with potential participants at program
onset. Concerns regarding recall bias were addressed both through the
design of the survey and careful training and monitoring of the enumerators
to ensure that respondents gave their best recollection of past amounts and
activities. In addition, in our analyses we attempt to deal with the recall
bias inherent with a retrospective survey.
China’s Grain for Green program
Starting in 1999 as a pilot program, the Grain for Green program was
implemented by China’s government as a cropland set-aside program to
increase forest cover and prevent soil erosion on sloped cropland. By the
end of 2002, officials expanded the program to some 15 million farmers in
more than 2000 counties in 25 provinces and municipalities in China (Xu
et al., 2004a). According to the program rules, each participating farmer
receives three types of compensation: in-kind grain compensation, cash
compensation, and free seedlings. In-kind grain and cash compensation are
both given out every year upon successfully passing an inspection; free
seedlings are provided in the initial year. The program also is designed so
that there are only two levels of in-kind grain compensation nationwide.
Differences in in-kind payments are justified by the inherent differences
in regional average yields. The compensation level is 1,500 kilograms per
hectare per year in the Yellow River Basin and is 2,250 kilograms per hectare
per year in the Yangtze River Basin. In cash equivalent terms these are 3,150
yuan and 2,100 yuan per hectare per year, respectively.4 In total, the three
types of compensation amount to 3,150 yuan per hectare in the middle
3 Errors occur in retrospective surveys because respondents may either completely
forget events or mis-date them (Dex, 1991). If these errors are systematically
correlated with explanatory variables in the regression models, they may bias
the coefficients. In particular, it would be a serious problem if the bias is correlated
with program participation. Although we cannot test such correlation using
our data set, we do not have compelling reasons why either participating or
non-participating households would systematically misreport pre-program status
because of forgetting or mis-dating. The difference in average educational level
between the two groups is not statistically significant and there is no reason to
believe that one group is more biased than the other.
4 The annual average official exchange rate in 2001 was 8.28 Chinese yuan to the
US dollar. The Purchasing Power Parity conversion factor in 2001 was 1.9 yuan to
the dollar World Bank (2003).
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and upper reaches of Yellow River for the first year of conversion, and
2,400 yuan per year from the second year on. In the upper reaches of the
Yangtze River, the program pays farmers 4,200 yuan per hectare the first
year and 3,450 yuan per year from the second year on. If Purchasing Power
Parity is used as the conversion rate, the average first year compensation
amounts to a payment that is more than ten times the average per hectare
rental payment under a similar program in the US (Uchida et al., 2005).
Moreover, the level of compensation is not trivial relative to the earnings
of the typical participating household in our sample. For example, if an
average household in Sichuan Province (Yangtze River Basin) received full
compensation, it would receive 340 yuan per capita, which is a sum of
money equal to 24 per cent of the household’s pre-program average total
income per capita in 1999.5 Xu et al. (2004a) have found, however, that the
actual delivery of payments often falls short (although this happens only in
some villages, and not in most).6
Since the main objective of China’s program is to restore the nation’s
forests and grasslands to prevent soil erosion, program designers have
made the steepness of the slope one of the main criteria by which plots
are selected for inclusion into the Grain for Green program. The steepness
criterion means that the program in southwest China targets land with
25 degrees of slope or more for inclusion into the program. In the northwest
the program targets land with 15 degrees of slope or more. Using a targeting
mechanism such as slope also has the advantage that it is relatively easy
to observe, which could make project monitoring more effective. Some
studies have found, however, that the program’s targeting has been less
than optimal in some regions where some productive and low sloped plots
were retired when less productive and high sloped plots were still available
(Xu et al., 2004a; Uchida et al., 2005).7 Most close observers believe the Grain
for Green program has been ‘quasi-voluntary’; although households had
the ultimate decision of whether or not to participate, some households
that have plots meeting the steepness criterion were ‘strongly encouraged’
to participate. In fact, Xu et al. (2004a) finds that only 15 per cent of the
participating households in the sample were consulted before program
5 This was calculated as follows. The average program area of households in our
sample in Sichuan Province (Yangtze River Basin) in 2002 was 7.15 mu (=0.477
hectare). If a participating household received full compensation, it would amount
to 1,646 yuan (using the compensation level from the second year and on). Using
an average household size of 4.84 members (which it was in Sichuan in 1999), this
amounted to 340 yuan per capita, which was a sum of money equal to 24 per cent
of pre-program average total income per capita.
6 Full compensation may not reach participating farmers for several reasons. Village
officials may deduct labor cost to plant trees on the farmer’s program plots. They
may deduct back-taxes owed by the farmer. In other cases, some plots are retired
before being fully certified under the program (Zuo, 2002; Xu et al., 2004a).
7 From the perspective of program goals, however, it may be favorable to retire
plots with no slope under certain circumstances. For example, low sloped plots
that may be productive could also be effective in preventing soil from entering a
river system.
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implementation, and only 30 per cent had the autonomy to choose which
plots to retire.
While preventing soil erosion is the primary objective, poverty alleviation
has been stated as another goal of the Grain for Green program (State
Forestry Administration, 2002). Many local governments consider it as an
opportunity to promote the transformation of the county’s local economic
structure. Field interviews conducted by the authors revealed that many
county, town, and village leaders as well as farmers were attracted to the
program’s high level of compensation.8 Therefore, if returns were truly
high, as long as poor households are included in the project, it is reasonable
to expect some positive impact of the program on poverty alleviation. In
the rest of this paper we examine this issue more carefully, seeking to
assess whether the poor households are disproportionately participating in
the program, and what impact the program has had on the participating
households.
3. Determinants of participation
While the Grain for Green program did not directly target the poor, we
expect that most of the participants are relatively poor compared to China’s
average rural household. Forestry officials designed the program to target
sites that have a high potential to minimize the effects of off-site soil erosion;
the program criterion is not designed to target the poor directly. But since
poor households were historically the ones that were pushed on to marginal
plots in the upland regions of China’s main watersheds, the program may
be implicitly targeting poor households.
Strategy to explain determinants of participation
The first step in understanding the determinants of participation is to
understand the nature of participating households and compare them
to those that did not participate. In our sample, participating and non-
participating households share certain characteristics, but differ in income
level and asset holdings (tables 1 and 2).9 For example, households in both
groups are similar in terms of the number of children and adults as well as
the age and level of education of the head of household (table 1). The two
8 We recognize that compensation standards do not account for regional and inter-
household production variability and opportunity costs. Without accounting for
this, of course, the program is subject to mis-targeting in both ways – both
by overpaying some farmers that would have been willing to participate at a
lower compensation rate, and by making farmers participate at a rate which
they believed was not sufficient to offset their opportunity cost (particularly if
a household participates involuntarily.) In some villages, however, the leaders
converted more cropland than the allocated program quota, hoping to be included
in future rounds of the program. Some interviewed farmers were willing to convert
more cropland even with half of the current compensation level. From these
observations we believe that the promised compensation level generally has been
attractive compared to the opportunity cost of setting aside the cropland (i.e., the
forgone revenue from cultivating the land).
9 All values for 2002 are adjusted for inflation using consumer price index for each
province.
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groups differ, however, in initial income levels and asset holdings (table 2).
Interestingly, the participating households have lower levels of income and
assets prior to the program. In particular, total income per capita, housing
value, and consumer durables in 1999 were lower for the participating
households.
On average participating households had access to more land but had
lower levels of other assets before the program: participating households
had about 14 mu of cropland, whereas non-participating ones had 10 mu
(1 mu equals 1/15th of a hectare). Housing value, often recognized as
a more accurate measure of wealth than income (since it is more easily
observable and measured with less error), also is lower for participating
households (13,659 yuan) compared to non-participating ones (20,067
yuan).10 Participating households also had lower levels of livestock
holdings in 1999 (385 yuan) compared to non-participating ones (414
yuan).11 With such differences, any analysis of the effect of Grain for
Green clearly must control for the differences in the initial characteristics of
participating and non-participating households.
To further investigate the factors determining participation in the
program, we first estimate kernel densities to trace out the income
distributions of participating and non-participating households. If the poor
were disproportionately selected into the program, the income distribution
of the participating households would be to the left of the distribution
of non-participants. We then use limited dependent variable regression
methods to examine the marginal effects of each determinant on program
participation.
To examine the decision to participate or not, we use a fixed-effect
logit model, which can be expressed by Pr(Pi = 1) = (X′iβ), where
Pi = 1 if household i participates in the Grain for Green program and
0 otherwise and X is a matrix of the explanatory variables described
above. The model includes county fixed effects to control for unobservable
county characteristics.12 We use explanatory variables corresponding to
three groups of factors that may have been used by local governments
as criteria for deciding if villages and households should be included in
the Grain for Green program: environmental factors (slope, distance to
waterway), wealth factors (income, land and asset holdings before the
program; migration status before the program), and implementation costs
10 Housing value is based on self-reported values.
11 We collected full data on livestock for 2002 including revenue from livestock,
prices, initial and ending stocks, outflow, and death counts. For 1999 we only
have data on prices, initial stock and outflow, and death counts. To approximate
the livestock value in 1999 we used the prices and outflow counts, multiplied by
1.02, the correlation coefficient between ending stock value and the sum of that
and the revenue from livestock in 2002.
12 We cannot include village or township fixed effects because a few villages and
townships in our sample only had participating households. Had we included
village fixed effects we could control for unobservable village characteristics that
are invariant across households in each village, but at the expense of dropping
more than 20 households from the analyses. Given the relatively small sample size
we chose not to do so.
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(e.g., proximity to a public road). In addition, we also included other
household characteristics.
We then use a random effect Tobit model to explain the total area of land
in the program by each household, where y∗i is the total cropland area of
household i that was enrolled in the Grain for Green program. The variable
y∗i is truncated since all non-participating households have zero values and
participating households have strictly positive values. The covariates in the
model are the same as those in the logit model except that the maximum
slope of the household’s plots is not included.13 This model is estimated
with random village-level effects.
Results
The kernel density estimates of log of income per capita for participating
and non-participating households illustrate that the income distributions
of the two groups before the program (1999), in fact, were quite similar
(figure 1). Although the means are statistically different at the 10 per cent
level and the variance of participating households was somewhat smaller
than for the non-participants, it is difficult to see striking differences. Most
importantly, while there is considerable heterogeneity in levels of per capita
income among households, it should be noted that most if not all of the
households in our sample are absolutely poor with nearly 99 percent below
the US $2 per day poverty line.
The results of the determinants of participation analyses also suggest
that low income households were neither disproportionately included nor
excluded from China’s Grain for Green program (table 3). The estimated
marginal effect of income level in 1999 was zero and insignificant (column
1). Holding all other factors constant, the poverty status of a household was
not a determining factor of participation. The household’s income level also
did not affect how much cropland area was retired (column 2). Although
on the one hand such a result would suggest that the program did not
excessively target the poor, a more positive spin can also be put on it. First,
the poor were not disproportionately excluded; second, since most people
in the study areas were poor (average income was only 69 per cent of the
average income of rural households in China), a substantial number of at
least relatively poor households were included.14
The results of the logit and tobit analyses illuminate other determinants of
participation. For example, households with higher-sloped plots were more
likely to participate (0.083), a finding that was expected since the steepness
of a plot’s slope was regarded as the principal criterion of site selection
for the program. The estimated coefficient on household head’s age (0.008)
suggests that a household with an older household head is more likely to
participate, a finding consistent with studies examining the determinants
in the US CRP program (e.g., Skaggs et al., 1994). Finally, the estimated
13 This variable was not included because although it may be important for making
a household eligible for the program, we believe that it will not affect the quantity
of the land in the program.
14 Annual net income per capita in 1999 was 2,210 yuan for rural households and
5,854 yuan for urban households. Our sample average was 1,518 yuan.
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Figure 1. Kernel Density of Log of Income per Capita for Participating versus Non-
participating Households in 1999.
Notes: The vertical line corresponds to the two-dollars-a-day poverty line in
1999 (US $1,112.59 or 9212 Chinese Yuan). In logarithm the value is equivalent
to 9.13. The two-dollars-a-day poverty line in 1999 was calculated based on the
1996 poverty line reported in Sala-i-Martin (2002) (US $1064) and by adjusting
for inflation using deflators reported in the World Economic Outlook 2002 (Sala-
i-Martin, 2002).
Source: Authors’ survey.
coefficient of the variable measuring the number of adult migrants in
the household (0.099) suggests that the probability of participating in the
program is 10 per cent higher for a household with an additional adult
migrant (or at least there is a positive correlation between migration and
participation). For households that had already sent a household member
into the migrant labor force before the program, the Grain for Green
program may have become an opportunity to take some cropland out of
production, which could be attractive because many forestry activities result
in labor savings compared to cultivation.
We also tested whether or not the slopes of the explanatory variables
differed among the three provinces. In the logit model, we found that
coefficients are statistically significantly different for two regressors:
‘distance to waterway’ and ‘maximum slope’. The marginal effect of
‘distance to waterway’ is small but positive and statistically significant
for Sichuan Province but statistically insignificant for the other two
provinces. The marginal effect of maximum slope is positive and statistically
significant for Sichuan Province but statistically insignificant for the other
two provinces. These findings suggest that the participation decision
was systematically different for Sichuan Province. Importantly, the slope
criterion may have been best implemented in Sichuan. In the Tobit model,
we found that coefficients are statistically significantly different for four
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Table 3. Fixed-effect logit and random-effect tobit regressions results explaining
determinants of households’ program participation and land size in the Grain for
Green program
(1) Program
participation
(1=participate)
(2) Area in Grain
for Green (mu)
Total agricultural revenue per
capita in 1999 (yuan)
−0.000 (0.58) −0.001 (1.02)
rIncome per capita in 1999
(yuan)
−0.000 (1.04) 0.000 (1.17)
Land holding per capita (mu) 0.010 (0.50) 2.150 (9.57)∗∗∗
Maximum slope among
household’s plots
0.083 (2.88)∗∗∗
Fixed asset value in 1999 (yuan) 0.000 (0.23) −0.000 (1.15)
House value in 1999 (yuan) 0.000 (0.91) −0.000 (1.80)∗
Livestock value in 1999 (yuan) 0.000 (0.94) −0.001 (0.86)
Number of adult migrants in
household
0.099 (1.81)∗ −0.370 (0.58)
Distance from road to plots,
weighted average (meter)
0.000 (1.81)∗ −0.001 (1.52)
Distance from plots to house,
weighted average, ln (meter)
0.113 (2.55)∗∗ 1.710 (2.91)∗∗
Distance from plots to water,
weighted average (meter)
0.000 (0.890) 0.000 (1.17)
Household size 0.029 (1.78)∗ 2.120 (7.84)∗∗∗
Household head’s age 0.008 (1.83)∗ 0.018 (0.26)
Household head’s age
squared
−0.000 (1.65)∗ −0.001 (1.55)
Household head’s
educational attainment
−0.004 (0.45) −0.210 (1.60)
Constant −19.520 (3.61)∗∗∗
Observations 338 338
Number of counties 6
Number of villages 36
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1724
Notes: Means of marginal effects are reported in column (1). Absolute value
of z-statistics in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered on village. In
column (1) a constant is not estimated since we include county fixed effects.
∗significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
regressors: ‘land per capita’, ‘maximum slope’, ‘household size’, and ‘age
of household head squared’. Land per capita is positive and statistically
significant for all three provinces, but the magnitude of the coefficient for
Shaanxi is three times that of the other two provinces; maximum slope
is negative and statistically significant for Shaanxi but insignificant for the
other two; household size is positive and statistically significant for Shaanxi
but insignificant for the other two; finally, the household head’s age squared
is negative for Shaanxi but insignificant for the other two. In sum, factors
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determining the extent of participation were systematically different for
Shaanxi.
We have some evidence that a large portion of non-participating
households wanted to participate but could not. Based on a question where
we asked the non-participant respondents why they did not participate,
of the 87 non-participating households in our sample, a majority (47
households) indicated that they did not participate because their sloped
plots were not included in the program area.15 Only eight households
clearly indicated that they could have participated but did not want to
participate (mostly because either the compensation level was not high
enough or they did not believe that the compensation would be delivered
by the government). In sum, a majority of the households not enrolled in
the program also have plots with steep slopes and appear to have wanted
to participate if they had been given the opportunity.
4. Effects on income, assets, and labor allocation
We expect a direct and indirect income effect on the participants of the
Grain for Green program. The direct effect on income and assets is expected
to come through the grain and monetary compensation. In addition,
participation in Grain for Green also may change labor allocation decisions.
A land retirement program, like the Grain for Green program, has two
effects on household labor: a substitution effect and an income effect. With
a substitution effect a household retiring its cropland would shift its labor
freed by the program into other productive activities, such as on-farm
activities on the household’s remaining cropland, an off-farm wage job,
or the self-employment sector. But households may not shift all of their free
time that arose from participating in the program into productive activities
because of an income effect: a farmer may reallocate the time saved from
the program into leisure. Hence, whether or not we could expect increases
in off-farm labor is theoretically indeterminate.
Strategy for explaining program impacts
While the descriptive statistics show that on average income per capita
and asset values for the participating households increased between 1999
and 2002 (table 2), we cannot attribute these increases solely to the Grain
for Green program. It could be that other characteristics of participants
contributed to the income rises, and, in fact, there is a reason to suspect
that this is so. According to our data, average income and holdings of
certain assets are also increasing for non-participating households. In order
to obtain a more unbiased estimate of the impact of the Grain for Green
program on income, asset holdings, and labor allocation we first need to
hold constant the other effects in order to isolate the impact of the program
on these changes.
What we are trying to measure is often called the mean impact of
‘treatment on the treated’, which is the average impact of the program
15 Ten households were ineligible because they did not have sloped plots suitable
for the program.
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among those treated
TT = E((Y1 − Y0)|X, D = 1) = E(Y1|X, D = 1) − E(Y0|X, D = 1), (1)
where we denote Y1 as the outcome conditional on treatment, Y0 as the
outcome conditional on non-participation, D = 1 the group of individuals
who participated in the program for whom Y1 is observed, D = 0 those who
do not participate in the program for whom Y0 is observed. In reality we do
not observe the counterfactual mean, E(Y0|X, D = 1), or the mean outcome
for the participating group had they not participated in a program.
Since officials did not implement the Grain for Green program on the
basis of a randomized experiment, we cannot assume that the selection
bias is zero. To overcome the problem we employ three approaches:
propensity score matching method (PSM), difference-in-differences (DD),
and difference-in-differences matching method (DDM). PSM allows
the analyst to match the treated and the controls when observable
characteristics of participants and non-participants are continuous, or when
the set of explanatory factors that determine participation contains many
variables (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984). With the right data, it is possible
to estimate the propensity score and compare the outcomes of participating
and non-participating households that have similar propensity scores. We
can obtain the mean impact of the treatment on the treated by
E(Y1 − Y0|D = 1) = E{E(Y1|p(Z), D = 1) − E(Y0|p(Z), D = 0)|D = 1},
(2)
where p(Z) ≡ Pr(Treated|Z). By matching participating and non-
participating households with different values of Z but the same values of
Pr(D = 1|Z), any differences in E(Y0) between the two groups difference out
when calculating the above equation. The observable covariates Z should
include all of the relevant characteristics that determine participation and
the outcomes of interest. In our analyses, Z includes a number of variables
including total income per capita, agricultural income per capita, asset
values before the program (housing values, consumer durables, productive
fixed assets), labor allocation (number of migrating adult household
members), and other household and plot characteristics. We also include
county fixed effects to control for unobservable factors at the county level
that may affect participation.16
To implement PSM successfully, the nature of the samples of participating
and non-participating households must meet certain criteria and several
other choices must be made. Importantly, the common support of the
balancing score for participating and non-participating households should
be and is, in fact, fairly wide (figure 2), so information from a large share
of the households can be used in the analysis. We choose to use the nearest
neighbor matching method with replacement. Following Smith and Todd
(2005), we match on the log odds-ratio so that the estimates are robust to
choice-based sampling, where the proportion of the treatment group in the
data is over-sampled relative to their frequency in the population of persons
16 The specification is the same as the logit model in the previous section.
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Figure 2. Distribution of estimated log odds-ratios for participating and non-
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Note: 0=Non-participating households, 1=Participating households,
Source: Authors’ survey.
eligible for the program. We follow Dehejia and Wahba (2002) and estimate
an ‘adjusted’ version: a weighted regression where the comparison units
are weighted by the number of times that they are matched to a treated
unit. This method can potentially improve the precision of the estimates
(Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Standard errors are bootstrapped using 1,000
replications. A balancing test that follows Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002)
was satisfied for all covariates.
While PSM is increasingly being used in program evaluations, it relies on
a key underlying assumption that is not always valid – that the outcomes (in
our case, the conditional means) are independent of program participation
conditional on the propensity score estimated from a set of observable
characteristics. Formally, this can be written as
E(Y0|P(Z), D = 1) = E(Y0|P(Z), D = 0). (3)
While we control for unobservable differences at the county level using
fixed effects when estimating the propensity score, there may still be
systematic, unobservable differences between the outcomes of participants
and non-participants. The systematic differences could arise, for example,
because households are selected into the Grain for Green program based
on unmeasured household, village, or township characteristics, or because
earning levels differ among labor markets in which the participating and
non-participating households reside. Such differences would violate the
identification conditions required for matching.
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To control for such unobservable characteristics, we next employ
difference-in-differences. DD compares outcomes before and after a policy
change for a group affected by the change (participants in the program)
to a group not affected by the change (non-participants of the program –
Meyer, 1995). Let t and t′ denote time periods after and before the program,
respectively. The DD estimate is given by
DD = [E(Yt|D = 1) − E(Yt′ |D = 1)] − [E(Yt|D = 0) − E(Yt′ |D = 0)] . (4)
The idea is to correct the simple difference before and after for the treatment
group by subtracting the simple difference for the control group. By
comparing the before–after change of treated units with the before–after
change of control units, any common trends, which will show up in the
outcomes of the control units as well as the treated units, get differenced
out (Smith, 2004). The DD estimator can also get rid of the recall bias inherent
in a retrospective survey to the extent that such bias is the same for both
participants and non-participants. In the paper we report the unrestricted
and adjusted DD estimate which relaxes the implicit restrictions in the
standard DD estimator that the coefficient associated with Yt′ (pre-program
outcome) and covariates in t′ (pre-program period) equals 1, respectively.
Identification of the causal effects using DD relies on the assumption
that absent the policy change, the average change in Yt − Yt′ would have
been the same for treated and the control. This is called the ‘parallel trend’
assumption, which can be expressed as
E(Y0,t|D = 1) − E(Y0,t′ |D = 1) = E(Y0,t|D = 0) − E(Y0,t′ |D = 0). (5)
As might be expected, the effectiveness of DD in a very real sense depends
on the validity of this assumption. Whether or not the assumption is valid
depends on the context of the study and on how similar the control and
treatment groups are. In general, the more similar are the treatment and
control groups, the more convincing the DD approach. Using our village
and household data we found (discussed above) that the participating
and the non-participating groups were significantly different in several
aspects, suggesting that the parallel trend assumption may not hold. While
we control for the observable pre-program variables in the reported DD
estimate, there could be other unobservable factors that may compromise
the parallel trend assumption.
To better control for the differences between participating and non-
participating households, we also can combine DD with a matching method
and implement a difference-in-differences matching strategy. With DDM we
can exploit the data on the participants in 1999 to construct the required
counterfactual, instead of just using the data in 2002 (as is used in the
PSM analysis). One additional advantage of DDM over DD is that the
assumptions that justify DDM estimation are weaker than the assumptions
necessary for DD or the conventional propensity score matching estimator
(Smith and Todd, 2005). DDM requires that in the absence of treatment, the
average outcomes for treated and controls would have followed parallel
paths
E(Y0,t|P(Z), D = 1) − E(Y0,t′ |P(Z), D = 1)
= E(Y0,t|P(Z), D = 0) − E(Y0,t′ |P(Z), D = 0) (6)
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which is weaker than the assumptions necessary for DD. DDM removes any
parallel, time-variant, unobservable differences between the participating
and non-participating households conditional on P(Z), a clear advantage
over cross-sectional propensity score matching. In fact, using outcomes
from experimental data as a benchmark, Smith and Todd (2005) found that
DDM performed better than DD or PSM.
In performing DDM we match by log odds-ratio and use the same nearest
neighbor matching method with replacement as in PSM. We report the
‘adjusted’ version, where the control units are weighted by the number
of times that they are matched to a treated unit. The standard errors are
bootstrapped using 1,000 replications.
Results of cross-sectional propensity score matching analyses
The results of cross-sectional PSM analysis, which (unlike DD) compares
the matched participating and non-participating households with similar
probability of participation, reveal that Grain for Green had some positive
effects on participating households (table 4, column 1). Although there is
no statistically significant effect on the household’s total income per capita,
the PSM results suggest that the program had a significant positive effect
on other agricultural income (from livestock activities), which increased
by 172 yuan. In contrast, crop income dropped by 172 yuan. In addition,
house value and livestock inventory values of the participating households
increased by 486 yuan and 180 yuan; the estimates for these variables
were statistically significant. We did not, however, find evidence of
significant program effect on the employment prospects of the adults in the
household.
The results that show only a marginal (or negligible) impact on income
are consistent with findings in Xu et al. (2004b). Using the difference-
in-differences analysis, the authors find that there is negative impact on
cropping income and positive impact on income from subsidies (Xu et al.,
2004b). In contrast to our paper, however, they use a model that is restricted
and unadjusted for other variables and do not examine the impacts of the
conservation set-aside program on household assets or labor allocation.
Results of difference-in differences analysis
The findings from difference-in-differences analysis suggest that the
program has had a significant impact on several of the income categories
and several of the asset categories when comparing participating
households with the non-participating ones (table 4, column 2). While crop
income decreased (significantly) by 114 yuan, other non-crop agricultural
income (from livestock enterprises) increased by 181 yuan, offsetting
the decrease in crop income. Although the estimates are not statistically
significant, the point estimates for fixed productive assets and livestock
inventories were 683 yuan and 161 yuan, respectively. The DD results also
did not find significant program impact on change in labor allocation into
off-farm work or migration.
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Table 4. Estimated effects of the Grain for Green program on changes in income, labor
allocation and asset holdings using difference-in-differences, 1999 to 2002
Propensity
score
matchinga
Difference-in-
differencesb
Difference-in-
difference
matchingb
Dependent variable Y(2002) Y(2002) – Y(1999) Y(2002) – Y(1999)
Income per capita
(yuan)
−11.36 (0.10) 88.19 (0.61) −11.36 (0.09)
Crop income per
capita (yuan)
−172.21 (3.14)∗∗∗ −114.34 (3.75)∗∗∗ −167.14 (3.32)∗∗∗
Other agricultural
income per capita
(yuan)
171.99 (2.27)∗∗ 180.56 (1.67)∗ 168.02 (2.36)∗∗
Non-agricultural
income per capita
(yuan)
−80.38 (0.82) −2.92 (0.04) −29.28 (0.36)
Off-farm work
(number of adults
with off-farm work
in household)
−0.04 (0.04) 0.0034 (0.08) 0.045 (1.62)∗
Migration status
(number of adult
migrants in
household)
−0.04 (0.04) −0.018 (0.25) −0.04 (0.58)
Value of house (yuan) 485.80 (2.39)∗∗ 323.13 (0.90) 521.80 (2.51)∗∗
Fixed productive
assets (yuan)
320.23 (0.89) 682.97 (1.36) 312.77 (0.80)
Livestock inventories
(yuan)
180.00 (2.94)∗∗∗ 161.15 (1.46) 220.02 (2.74)∗∗∗
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. The estimates are
adjusted for inflation. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at
1%
aThe standard errors were bootstrapped using 1,000 replications. The
propensity score model is the same as the logit model reported in table 3,
column 1. The balancing property was satisfied using the specification.
Following Smith and Todd (2005) we match on the log odds-ratio so that the
estimates are robust to choice-based sampling. The matching method used is
nearest neighbor matching method (random draw version) with replacement.
252 participating households were matched to 86 non-participating households.
Following Dehejia and Wahba (1999), the effects are estimated by performing
weighted least squares where treatment observations are weighted as 1 and
control observations are weighted by the number of times they are matched to
a treatment observations (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999).
bThe explanatory variables used in the regressions-adjusted equations are
value of the outcome variable in 1999, household size, land holding per capita,
education attainment of household head, age of household head, whether or
not the household head is female, maximum slope among plots belonging
to each household, minimum soil quality among plots belonging to each
household, income per capita in 1999, fixed assets in 1999, and village fixed
effects.
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Results of difference-in-differences matching analyses
In findings largely consistent with the DD and PSM analyses, the DDM
analysis results demonstrate that other agricultural income (from livestock),
the value of livestock inventories, and housing are higher for participating
households (table 4, column 3). Income from livestock, activities (and other
non-cropping agricultural activities) increased by 168 yuan; the family’s
housing value and livestock inventories also increased by 522 yuan and 220
yuan, respectively. The number of adults with off-farm work in households
also increased slightly (by 0.05 persons). Crop income, as expected from a
cropland set aside program, declined by 167 yuan, also consistent with the
previous results.
Although most of the signs on the estimates are consistent with the
cross-sectional PSM results, the magnitude of the coefficients differs to
some extent between the two methods for some outcomes of interest (e.g.,
crop income and livestock inventories.) As described previously, DDM
differs from cross-sectional PSM in that it removes any unobservables that
change in parallel between participating and non-participating households
conditional on the propensity score, suggesting that the conditional
independence assumption of cross-sectional PSM does not hold in these
data. Instead, it appears that a substantial amount of bias remains
after conditioning on the covariates included in the propensity score
specification. This bias that is parallel between the two groups is differenced
out by the DDM estimator.
Discussion
In summary, using DD, PSM, and DDM approaches with different
models, we have found that there have been positive, although somewhat
nuanced, effects on participating households. The strongest finding is that
participants have increased their non-cropping income and asset base to
offset the fall in cropping income. Although we have not yet distinguished
between different categories of households (poor versus relatively better
off) as we do below, the findings do show that households in these fairly
poor areas have benefited from the implementation of the largest Payment
for Environmental Services mechanism in the developing world.
While it is unclear exactly why households enjoyed increases in some
assets and livestock income and not greater participation in off-farm
activities despite the direct payments and labor savings provided by the
program, there are several plausible explanations. First, since we use cash
accounting methods to measure assets, the higher direct income effects that
might be associated with participation in the program may be being offset
by lower realized income from families that chose to increase their holdings
of livestock. If participating households decide to build up their livestock
inventories (as our data suggest) in anticipation of higher incomes in the
coming years, they would be deferring income (in a cash accounting sense).
In other words, if accrual accounting methods had been used, there would
have been higher incomes instead of assets. In fact, during a number of trips
to the field, we observed that in many areas Grain for Green is accompanied
by efforts of villagers to increase their livestock enterprises. Such a shift, in
fact, might be expected since most of the compensation is paid in grain that
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can be used for feed, and also since in some regions, households – which
have more time available, especially after the first year of the program – are
allowed to plant fodder, alfalfa, and other mulches that not only provide
protection for the soil during the initial growth periods of the newly planted
trees, but also can be used as feed.
Households also may be using the newly freed up labor in the first
years of the program, not for activities that lead immediately to greater
incomes, but for investing in other parts of their asset portfolios, including
the construction of their home. In several interviews, farmers told us that
with the reduced need to spend time in agriculture due to the lower labor
requirement of the newly planted forests after the first year, they were able
to spend their time on building a new house or renovating their old one.
Housing in rural China is by far the largest asset in a household’s portfolio
and many households use hundreds of hours or more of their labor in
building their house. This is especially true in some forested areas (where
the Grain for Green program is mostly implemented) since households
use their labor to cut trees and saw them into planks that can be used for
constructing their homes. Our results would be consistent with a scenario
in which many participating farm households have chosen to use the labor
that they otherwise would have devoted to the cultivation (or some other
activity) to build their houses.
One of our most surprising findings is that there was not a significant
increase in off-farm employment activities.17 Interviews before and during
the implementation of Grain for Green frequently found that local leaders
and villagers expected that setting aside an appreciable amount of their
land would shift labor into the off-farm sector. It could be, however, that
such expectations have not been realized, since finding an off-farm job may
require more than a desire to work off the farm; connections, human capital
and social capital have often proved to be the most important determinants
of access to off-farm jobs for rural households. Furthermore, since the
household surveys collected information on labor allocation decisions for
only the first three years after the initiation of the program, it may have
been too soon to detect changes.
5. Impact on the poorer participants
So far we have addressed the program’s impact on typical participating
households. As our last step in the assessment of Grain for Green on poverty
we examine whether or not the impact of the program was different for the
relatively poorer participants compared to the relatively better-off parti-
cipating households (which as discussed are often still absolutely poor –
most being below US$2/day). Different program impacts are plausible
given the fact that livestock activities, for example, require labor investment
17 These findings are different from the case studies in Xu and Cao (2002), who
found that non-agricultural income (income from off-farm wage earnings and
self-employed sectors) increased on average after the program in all six case study
counties. These case studies examine only sample statistics of the participating
households and do not compare with the non-participating households; therefore,
the income changes cannot be attributed solely to the program.
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(for collecting feed and for increased care), which may be more attractive
for the poorer households who have fewer outside options and thus lower
shadow wages compared to some of the wealthier participating households.
In addition, constructing a house requires not only labor but also investment
into housing materials, which should be more readily available for better-off
households.
To test whether or not the program impacts depend on the level of
poverty, we first divided all households into quantiles based on total income
in 1999. Next, to examine the poverty effect, we estimate the following
county fixed-effect regression
Yi = β0 +
4∑
j=1
β j Quantile j ∗ Participationi + δZi + γ ac + εi ,
where Yi is the change in our outcomes of interest (i.e., income, asset
holdings, and labor allocation), Quantile j ∗ Participation is an interaction
term between a quantile dummy (equals 1 if the household belongs to the jth
quantile) and a participation dummy, Zi is, as before, a vector of household
characteristics, and ac is a county fixed effect to control for time-invariant
unobservables at the county level. In essence, this approach jointly estimates
difference-in-differences for each income quantile. We will then test the null
hypothesis β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 using a joint F-test.
The impact of Grain for Green on poverty
The results from the regression analyses suggest that the program does not
systematically favor the poor or the better-off participants (table 5). The
program impact on value of fixed assets is clearly largest for participants in
the richest quantile (column 8, row 4). In fact, the value of fixed assets was
the only variable in which the null hypothesis of all coefficients being equal
was rejected (column 8, last row). The point estimates of program impact on
other variables such as crop income (column 2), other agricultural income
(column 3), and livestock (column 9) also differ across quantiles. The joint
F-test, however, was not rejected in those models, suggesting that the
program impact does not differ across quantiles.
Overall, the results suggest that within an area that is relatively poor,
there are few distributional effects, in that there are minimal statistically
significant differences between the impacts on the poorer and the better-off
participating households. The main reason why we do not find systematic
differences in program impacts may be because the majority of households
in our sample are poor, both in relative and absolute terms, and their
surrounding market conditions are similar so that the ways participants
are affected through program compensation and use their freed-up labor
do not differ after controlling for household characteristics and county fixed
effects.
Impact on future income streams
In addition to the short-term program effects on income and household
assets, one added potential effect on participating households is the future
income stream associated with the forest and non-timber commodities that
E
nvironm
entand
D
evelopm
entE
conom
ics
615
Table 5. Estimated impact of the Grain for Green program and initial income quantile on changes in income, labor allocation and asset holding,
1999 to 2002
Dependent variable: change in income, labor, asset holding (2002–1999)
Total income Crop income
Other
agricultural
income
Non-agricultural
income
Off-farm
work
Migration
status House value Fixed assets Livestock
Quantile1∗participate 111.67 −122.14∗∗ 67.23 34.60 0.003 0.092 388.23 798.37 56.12
(0.60) (−3.15) (0.52) (0.37) (0.06) (1.07) (0.90) (1.37) (0.43)
Quantile2∗participate 203.33 −98.27∗ 336.13∗ −60.06 0.007 −0.068 154.24 −49.18 159.73
(1.14) (−2.59) (2.65) (−0.66) (0.13) (−0.79) (0.37) (−0.09) (1.24)
Quantile3∗participate 128.92 −83.32∗ 209.12∗ 6.83 −0.022 −0.096 166.32 −46.60 316.27∗∗
(0.78) (−2.37) (1.75) (0.08) (−0.46) (−1.19) (0.42) (−0.09) (2.62)
Quantile4∗participate 97.43 −98.88∗ 253.48∗ −84.38 0.007 −0.029 334.51 1767.81∗∗ 130.94
(0.53) (−2.59) (1.96) (−0.90) (0.13) (−0.33) (0.79) (3.00) (1.00)
Ho: All coefficients
equal
Not
rejected
Not rejected Not rejected Not rejected Not
rejected
Not
rejected
Not
rejected
Rejected Not
rejected
Notes: ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Households were divided into quantiles based on total income in 1999 (before program) as shown in appendix table. Quantile 1 is the
poorest and quantile 4 is the richest. All models control for base value of the outcome variable in 1999, household size, land holding
per capita, household head’s age and education, a dummy for a female household head, maximum slope among household’s plots,
weighted average of distance from plots to a road, water source, and house, and county fixed effects.
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Table 6. Types of trees planted in the Grain for Green program by income quantile,
1999 to 2002
Quantile of household income in 1999
Tree type
1st
quantile
2nd
quantile
3rd
quantile
4th
quantile All participants
Ecological trees 43% 51% 61% 68% 56%
Cash crop trees 50% 43% 33% 41% 41%
Grass 20% 8% 7% 14% 12%
Grass and trees 32% 14% 21% 8% 19%
Others 4% 0% 0% 2% 1%
Number of
participating
households in
each quantile
56 65 72 59 252
Note: Each household may plant one or more types of trees. The households
were grouped into quantiles based on income in 1999 using the whole sample.
Source: Authors’ survey.
are created during Grain for Green. While it is too early to precisely quantify
the future income stream, our data indicate that households in general
should benefit, but the expected returns vary, depending on the types of
trees that were planted. The two types of trees with large shares of the newly
planted forestry areas are the so-called ‘ecological trees’, such as Chinese
fir and Japanese cedar, and ‘cash crop trees’, such as chestnut, walnut and
peach. In our sample ecological trees and cash crop trees were planted by
56 per cent and 41 per cent of the participating households, respectively.
While the cash crop trees are generally expected to generate revenue from
fruit and nut production within a few years, ecological trees will not be
profitable to harvest for at least a decade.
Interestingly, there are differences in types of trees planted depending on
a household’s income level (table 6). The households in the fourth quantile
(the richest quantile) tend to plant more ecological trees (68 per cent) and
less grass (14 per cent) and grass–tree intercropping mixes (8 per cent),
whereas the households in the first quantile (the poorest quantile) tend to
plant not only ecological trees (43 per cent) and cash crop trees (50 per cent)
but also more grass (20 per cent) and grass–tree intercropping mixes (32 per
cent).18
18 The distribution of tree types may reflect the suitability of tree types for different
geographical conditions. For example, Gansu Province is generally flatter and
is more suitable for livestock grazing than Sichuan Province, and thus more
suitable to plant grass or grass/trees. In our sample, Gansu Province has
disproportionately more households in the 1st quantile, where Sichuan Province
has disproportionately more households in the 4th quantile (appendix table).
Therefore the observation that more households in the 1st quantile plant grass
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The tree types that the participating households chose have implications
on the extent of income smoothing from on-farm activities and availability
of labor for off-farm work. The poorer participants that plant grasses
typically grow fodders to feed the livestock. This may help them smooth the
income stream from on-farm activities compared to planting only ecological
trees, which only become profitable after one or more decades. The ability
to smooth income, however, comes at the cost of increased on-farm labor;
planting and using fodder for livestock requires more on-farm labor input.
The richer participants, on the other hand, tended to plant more ecological
trees that only generate income years later but require less labor during the
growth period. While the program impact on the long-term income stream
is difficult to predict, the differences in tree types may suggest that the
richer participants have the potential to achieve the structural change from
on-farm to off-farm labor sooner than the poorer participants.
6. Conclusion
Our paper has examined the effect of China’s PES program on the welfare
of rural households. Using a number of alternative approaches, the study
found that the income of participants from livestock activities and some
asset holdings have clearly increased more than those of non-participants.
Even though the majority of participating households may not have
participated voluntarily and the actual delivery of payments in some areas
have been shown to fall short of the original promised amounts (Xu et al.,
2004a), the program has had positive effects. Although the program did
not disproportionately favor poorer population, most of the households in
the targeted program regions are poor both in relative and absolute terms;
since the participants are better off on average, the program is benefiting
the poor. Hence, in addition to providing environmental services (most
observers agree that soil erosion has been greatly reduced), China’s Grain
for Green program has raised the wealth of villagers who are mostly quite
poor.
Somewhat surprisingly, the results do not generate strong evidence
for the expected finding that participating households have changed
labor allocation by shifting labor into off-farm work. Nevertheless, in the
analysis using the most stringent assumptions, there is weak evidence that
participating households have begun to marginally increase the allocation
or grass/trees and that Gansu has disproportionately more households in the
1st quantile suggest that the tree types may be reflecting geographical and
climatic conditions. We also should note that only 36 per cent of the participating
households had a choice over which trees to plant. When we repeated the same
analysis for those households who had the tree type choice (n = 89), we still
find that richest households tended to plant more ecological trees and less grass,
whereas the poorest households tended to plant not only ecological and cash crop-
type trees but also grass and grass/cash crop-type tree intercropping mixes. We
also found that a somewhat smaller share of households chose to plant ecological
trees and more chose instead to plant cash crop trees, grass, or grass/trees. There
were no major differences found in the impact of the program when considering
whether or not a household was consulted before the program or not.
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of household labor to off-farm activities. Our empirical results suggest
that so far much of the freed up labor from cultivation and program
compensation, most of which has been paid as in-kind grain, have been
used to build up livestock. Moreover, it may be too early in the life of the
program to have seen large changes, and it is also possible that additional
efforts, such as training and other human capital increasing programs, are
needed to provide villagers with the tools and connections needed to help
households move their activities off the farm.
While the results illustrate the potential for a PES program to benefit the
participants, our analysis necessarily suggests caution in assigning more
widespread implications. First, it is difficult to draw nationwide conclusions
based on a small sample from three provinces. Based on the same sample, Xu
et al. (2004a) found that many participating households were not consulted
prior to the program and that the actual compensation delivered did not
always meet the level that was promised ex ante. In other regions in China,
the compensation may have been delivered as promised, which would
increase the effect of the program on poverty alleviation.19 We did not
find evidence that the compensation level is any higher or lower relative
to the opportunity cost for households who participated voluntarily; but
because our sample sites only covered a small share of the entire program’s
command area, it may not be true for other regions that were not included
in our survey. Lastly, although survival rate of the planted seedlings was
not a concern in our sample (above 70 per cent for almost all villages
reported in 2002), other regions may suffer from low survival rate and fail
the inspections necessary to receive the compensation.
Additional research also is needed, since three years is almost certainly
too short of a time to assess the impact of a program on any more
fundamental structural transformations. An effort also should be made
to understand the mechanism by which Grain for Green led to higher
income, asset holdings, and increased off-farm labor. We are concerned that
if farmers are unable to find alternative off-farm income sources during the
program period and if they are not allowed to convert the program land
back into cultivation when the program period ends, they may end up being
trapped in a state of poverty that was worse than before the program.
These caveats aside, China’s Grain for Green program appears to be
an example of a successful PES program that is being implemented in a
developing country. While the program officers of the Grain for Green
program do not seem to disproportionately target the poor, by far the
majority of the households in the program areas are relatively poor. Given
this fact, even without explicitly targeting the poor, the program clearly has
had a positive impact on many of the poor participants. Such results may
mean that as the world continues to invest in PES programs there will be
positive implications for poverty alleviation.
19 There is no reason, however, to believe that the households in our sample were
any more or less likely to be in regions that systematically underpay them for their
tree planting activities.
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Appendix table: Distribution of household income by province, 1999.
Quantile of household income in 1999 Number of
participants
in each
provinceProvince
1st
quantile
2nd
quantile
3rd
quantile
4th
quantile
Shaanxi 15% 25% 40% 19% 84
Gansu 35% 28% 20% 18% 97
Sichuan 13% 24% 27% 37% 71
Number of
participating
households in
each quantile
56 65 72 59 252
Note: The households were grouped into quantiles based on income in 1999
using the whole sample (participating and non-participating households.)
Source: Authors’ survey.
